GNSS interference, encompassing both jamming and spoofing, has moved from an occasional hazard near conflict zones into a persistent feature of European and Middle Eastern airspace. The question it now forces on regulators, pilots and controllers is a practical one: what procedures exist to protect crews and passengers when the navigation signal beneath a flight cannot be trusted, and are those procedures sufficient?
The answer, based on the recent actions of EASA, EUROCONTROL and IFALPA, is that the framework is evolving but incomplete.
Why GNSS Interference Has Become an Urgent Problem
A pilot's map display is only one of many systems that depend on the Global Navigation Satellite System. Signal corruption can ripple outward into connected aircraft systems in ways crews may not immediately detect. IFALPA has specifically noted that corrupted GNSS inputs can propagate through these systems in ways not fully transparent to flight crews, meaning a pilot may be unaware that degraded data is already driving their terrain alerts or traffic avoidance functions.
EASA and EUROCONTROL have confirmed that GNSS interference near conflict zones has become a routine occurrence rather than an exceptional one. Among the operational consequences both organisations have documented are incoherent navigation positions, re-routing or diversions, corrupted Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) outputs, and the degradation of Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) functions. Taken together, these effects represent a qualitative shift in what European airspace managers must plan for, with every individual consequence adding further workload for controllers and crews.
What Prompted a Joint Action Plan
Operational concern has been matched by growing political pressure. A joint letter addressed to the European Commission was submitted on 6 June 2025 by ministers representing 13 EU Member States, calling for coordinated action on GNSS interference. The move reflected a shared recognition among those states that the scale of the problem had exceeded what any of them could address independently.
EASA and EUROCONTROL responded by publishing a joint Action Plan on 26 March 2026. It is aimed, both organisations stated, at strengthening the safety and resilience of European aviation in the face of growing interference. EASA Executive Director Florian Guillermet was direct about the gap between current measures and what the situation demands: "While the potential threat to aviation safety from GNSS interference has so far been mitigated by short-term actions such as raising pilot awareness, it is clear that more needs to be done."
EUROCONTROL Director-General Raúl Medina framed the plan in similarly measured terms: "GNSS interference remains a significant and evolving challenge for European aviation, making today's Action Plan an important step forward in our collective response."
EuroWaypoint reports that the plan contains 22 actions organised across four workstreams covering human performance, organisational management, aircraft design, and infrastructure, with most action deadlines falling between 2026 and 2028.
What the Plan Requires
The Action Plan sets out measures across short, mid and longer-term horizons, including harmonised operational procedures and phraseologies for controllers and crews, according to EASA and EUROCONTROL. Harmonised phraseology matters because a controller and a crew using different terminology to describe a spoofing event risk talking past each other at a moment when precision is essential.
Over the longer term, EASA and EUROCONTROL envisage collaboration with aircraft manufacturers and the avionics industry to develop more interference-resilient avionics. That work addresses the root vulnerability: aircraft systems that place unconditional trust in GNSS signals they cannot independently verify.
EuroWaypoint reports that the four workstreams span human performance, organisational management, aircraft design and infrastructure, which means the plan is not solely a training exercise but also a prompt for manufacturers and infrastructure providers to act. The inclusion of aircraft design as a formal workstream is significant: it acknowledges that procedural mitigations can only go so far when the hardware itself was not designed with sustained GNSS denial in mind.
The Pilot and Industry Perspective
A formal statement on escalating GNSS radio-frequency interference events worldwide was issued by IFALPA's 2026 Conference, convened in Istanbul. Alongside its concern about cascading system effects, the federation called for coordinated action from states, ICAO, operators, manufacturers and air navigation service providers. The breadth of that list is itself significant: IFALPA is not asking any single party to act alone.
On the question of infrastructure, IFALPA argued strongly that conventional ground-based navigation aids, specifically VOR, DME and ILS, must be preserved until robust alternative resilience measures are in place across the globe. That position sits in some tension with decades of infrastructure rationalisation that has seen many states reduce or retire ground-based navaids as GNSS coverage was judged sufficient. The Istanbul statement implies that judgement now needs revisiting.
One mechanism for aggregating interference reports at scale is IATA's Flight Data eXchange programme, which EuroWaypoint reports has so far processed data from over 300 operators covering approximately 18.4 million flights. The sheer volume of information suggests that systematic, fleet-wide analysis of GNSS interference events is now technically within reach, even if the regulatory frameworks needed to mandate such reporting are still taking shape.
What This Means Going Forward
The 2026 action plan is best understood as a structure for work that has not yet been completed rather than a finished solution. The short-term measures, chiefly awareness and procedure, are already in motion. The harder questions, around avionics design and the future of ground-based navigation infrastructure, carry longer deadlines and depend on coordination among parties with different interests and timescales.
For pilots, the practical implication from IFALPA's position is that conventional navaid proficiency remains operationally relevant rather than a historical skill. For controllers, harmonised phraseology means that updated training will follow. For manufacturers, the design workstream is a formal invitation from regulators to treat GNSS resilience as a certification consideration.
Whether the 22 actions deliver a genuinely more resilient system by 2028 will depend on how faithfully each party, states, manufacturers, operators and service providers, executes its share of the plan. The EASA and EUROCONTROL framework identifies who is responsible. Delivery is the next question.
Readers interested in tracking how individual airlines are responding to evolving airspace challenges can use our Airline Search to browse operator profiles and routes across the region.
The Bottom Line
GNSS interference is no longer a niche concern confined to conflict-zone approaches. It is a systemic challenge that touches avionics design, ATC procedure, navaid infrastructure and pilot training simultaneously. The EASA and EUROCONTROL action plan provides a roadmap with real deadlines, but as Guillermet's own words acknowledge, the short-term mitigations already applied have only been partially adequate. The plan's value will be measured by what changes in cockpits, control rooms and design offices before 2028, not by its publication date.
This article draws on information from EASA (European Union Aviation Safety Agency) and IFALPA (International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations) and reporting by EuroWaypoint.
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